Abstract: This paper reviews and assesses the privatization of the banking sector in Hungary.
Introduction
In 1987, the Hungarian government created the two-tier banking system following reforms initiated under the regime of central planning in 1983 (see Ábel and Szakadát (1998) ). Superficially, the newly created commercial banks were to operate much like any comparable institution in an industrialized country. However, the new financial institutions were, for the most part, saddled with the bad debts accumulated under the previous regime. As pointed out by , the situation many transitional economies found themselves in is reminiscent of conditions faced by several industrial countries during the 1950s. In particular, bank credit was scarce, monetary policy was restrictive, and financial innovations absent. Moreover, the regulatory framework was not conducive to creating bank sector stability. Also, the regulatory framework did not favor the emergence of the kind of long-term financing that existing firms, whether private or of the state-owned variety, required for any chance of survival.
Indeed, there was a built-in bias toward lending to the government (see, inter alia, Ábel, Bonin and Siklos 1994) . The situation quickly became unsustainable as failing financial institutions turned to the National Bank of Hungary (NBH), in its role as lender of last resort, for a bailout. As the autonomy and credibility of the NBH were in jeopardy, the Hungarian government introduced a series of costly loan consolidation programs beginning in 1992 (e.g., see Várhegyi 1994 , Balassa 1996 . By some estimates the costs approached or even exceeded 10% of Hungary's GDP (Goldstein and Turner 1996, and The Economist 12-18 April 1997).
Clearly, the objective of the loan consolidation programs was the cleaning-up of the balance sheets of the banks to permit them to function on a sounder financial footing 2 (e.g., see NBH 1994) . However, the plans did nothing of the kind as the moral hazard problem became entrenched and participants came to believe that future injections of liquidity by the State and the central bank would be forthcoming. As Michaels (1997) states: "Recapitalization saved the banks, but didn't force change". The policy at the time also did not inspire outside investors -primarily foreign ones -to invest in an existing Hungarian bank. Instead foreign banks preferred to set-up shop in Hungary from scratch (so-called "greenfield" financial insitutions). Fundamentally, however, one cannot disassociate the macroeconomic climate, namely, the recession of 1991-93 in the western industrial world, from the climate in the Hungarian banking sector at the time (Siklos 1999) . Indeed, to this day, banks in Hungary continue to rank overall macroeconomic conditions as the main source of influence on the health of the banking sector (Magyar Nemzeti Bank 2000) .
Adding to the difficulties faced by the domestic banking sector were political factors, including a series of U-turns in policies and regulations, as successive coalition governments were elected to office. It is now fairly well accepted that political instability is one of many key determinants of banking crises (e.g., see Caprio and Klingenbiel 1996) . It is only with the creation of the privatization agency (ÁPV Rt.) that privatization seriously began in earnest.
The concerted push for privatization of the banking sector via an arm's length agency was an important step as, freed from the symbiotic connection to government, banks were able to pursue profitable lines of business.
The aims of the paper are three-fold. First, to describe the process of bank privatization in Hungary with special reference to the choices made by the agency in charge of 3 privatization. Second, to address the role and influence of foreign ownership of the banking system. Other than perhaps New Zealand or Chile, no other country can be said to have welcomed foreign ownership to the same degree. However, the pre-conditions leading up to the adopted policy was unlike that faced by most other countries and fairly unique in historical terms. As we shall see, the actual process of privatization would also be unique. Third, to provide some descriptive and empirical evidence about changes in the performance of the banking sector in Hungary prior to and following privatization and to assess the degree of fragility of the banking system.
2.
Bank Privatization: Concepts and Goals Table 1 provides a general overview of key indicators of the banking system in Hungary since 1989, including some data relative to the quality of loans made by the banking sector and the size of foreign direct investment. As an emerging economy with good growth potential and, therefore, experiencing strong capital inflows, the consequences were felt at the level of monetary policy decision-making and the choice of exchange rate regimes (see, inter alia, Siklos and Ábel 1997 and Siklos 1999) . Privatization occurred relatively quickly once the State Property Agency (i.e., the privatization agency) was created. In the interim, however, there would be several obstacles confronting policy makers.
4
Initial Conditions
A troubling early feature of the state of the banking sector is the extent to which it was called upon to advance credits to the State via so-called State Owned Enterprises (SOE), all of which tended to be severely undercapitalized at the outset of the transition.
Consequently, a large portion of bank assets were devoted to lending to governments and the data capture perfectly the poor role of Hungarian banks as true financial intermediaries for the private sector.
1
To some extent this was expected as the newly created banks inherited problems of the past (see Ábel and Szakadát (1998) and ). The combination of the onset of a recession, and emerging inflation following the adoption of market determined prices in a growing number of economic sectors, meant that the initial outlook for the domestic banking sector was inauspicious.
An initial difficulty was lax or inadequate banking supervision and regulatory forbearance that would also contribute to explain the high proportion of qualified loans and the weak state of the banking system more generally (also see de Juan 1996).
Ownership Structure Issues
In Hungary, the commercial portfolio of the NBH was sub-divided along sectoral lines leading to the creation of three stated-owned commercial banks. Trade Bank). Kormendi and Schatterly (1996) provide the details of this particular privatization.
6
The bottom line is that widely held ownership of banking stock was not facilitated either by regulation, tax incentives, and, in any event, was not attractive to the public in view of a serious asymmetric information problem (Balassa 1996) . Table 2 Hungary would produce a growing retail banking sector domestically controlled and a corporate sector largely foreign based (see Bonin and Ábel (2000) ). Table 3 makes the   7 point concerning the distribution of loans and deposits to households. These are overwhelmingly booked at domestically controlled banks. Table 4 Of course, there was also the perception, at least initially, that Hungary was a potentially attractive place for foreign investors to begin a foray into emerging markets. While macroeconomic stability was incomplete it appeared on the way to a sounder footing than in most transition economies.
The Role of the Regulatory Framework

5
Reserve requirement regulations also did not assist the growth of solvent financial institutions. The government insisted on high reserve requirements and that a significant fraction of these be held in the form of government debt instruments. The absence, at least initially, of proper bankruptcy and accounting standards prevented failing banks from becoming insolvent. Moreover, the bias in banks' balance sheet, toward holding high yield and relatively safe government debt, implied large profits which were an important source of tax revenue for the State. These developments reflect the central role played by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), effectively owner of many of the assets in question, in the regulation and operations of commercial banks.
In 1991 the Laws on Financial Institutions, Accounting and Bankruptcy required that banks meet the BIS capital adequacy ratios and imposed strict financial discipline on them. Unfortunately, as noted above, these landmark reforms occurred at a time of a deepening recession made worse by the break-up of the COMECON trading arrangement 8 between the countries of the Eastern block and the former Soviet Union. By the late 1990s, pressure for regulatory reform originated from the need to meet EU standards as part of Hungary's efforts at accession to the EU. By contrast, the early years of the last decade were spent attempting to meet BIS capital-adequacy standards.
The Foreign Ownership Question
An important distinguishing characteristic of the Hungarian experience is that the fraction of foreign-owned banks is relatively large. The IMF (2000) reports that the fraction of the Hungarian banking system in foreign hands reached almost 60% in 1999. Nevertheless, the report also concludes that consolidation may have a negative impact on the retail banking sector and, hence, ordinary consumers.
Among the possible drawbacks of foreign ownership of the bank sector include a potential bias in lending to firms based in the home country thereby placing domestic firms at a disadvantage since they would not have the same access to capital markets as competing foreign firms. In addition, there is the belief that foreign banks can "crowdout" domestic banks by undercutting them in the scope and costs of providing financial services. There is little in the literature to offer guidance about the net benefits or costs of foreign domination in banking since the experience of the transition economies is unlike that of other countries (e.g., New Zealand, Chile) that have permitted widespread foreign ownership of banks. Buch (1997 Buch ( , 2000 examines the case for foreign ownership in selected transition economies and finds that the policy is no panacea for solving banking sector related problems noted earlier. Indeed, there may even be a threshold level of foreign ownership necessary before the domestic segment of the banking sector feels the effects of competition. However, both papers ignore the specialization of banks into retail and commercial lending type activities discussed earlier an especially relevant feature in the Hungarian context.
It was in 1991 that a big change in bank sector policy began to take shape. The impact was felt economy wide as the resulting "credit crunch" did not permit the resumption of growth (see Siklos and Ábel 1997) .
Privatization and Financial Market Development
Below we examine some evidence regarding the performance and impact on Hungary from the transition to market and the eventual adoption of a deliberate policy of seeking foreign ownership of existing banks and permitting foreign banks to dominate the commercial banking industry.
Pre and Post Bank Privatization Performance
Figures 1 through 4 provide the main descriptive evidence about the baking sector before and after the process of privatization was in place. Figure 1 shows the ratio of qualified portfolio to the total portfolio. At the outset of the introduction of two-tiered banking, there was little in the way of bad debt. However, the infrastructure required to measure these, as well as the market's ability to discipline banks and borrowers, was not really in place until after 1991. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fraction of qualified debt then began to rise quickly, partly enhanced by the recession of the early 90s. By the time the last loan consolidation program was completed (1994-5), over one quarter of banks' portfolios were classified as qualified. However, once privatization began, and the regulatory framework was in place, a dramatic reversal begins to take place. Not only does the fraction of qualified portfolio fall, but the fraction of that doubtful debt in banks' portfolios is increasingly dominated not by "bad", "substandard", or "doubtful" but rather by debt that needs to be monitored or "watched". In general, the return on equity (ROE) is lower among foreign banks than for domestically based banks, at least for the countries examined in Table 6 , whereas the same is not true for Hungary if we separately consider medium and small banks. 
Negotiating with strategic foreign partners
Hungary is unique among emerging market economies in that, in 1995, a deliberate policy choice was made to seek strategic partners in privatizing large portions of the banking sector (Ábel 1997) . The policy choice reflects two factors at work. First, a strategic partner offers domestic policy makers protection against a future bank failure.
After all, a strategic partner, via the tender mechanism, has a stake in the future success of the bank. Otherwise the partner's reputation is at stake. Therefore, the likelihood that the strategic partner seeks to manage a successful operation is greatly enhanced. Further, the tender system offers an environment of competitive bids that not only ensures that the highest price is obtained but prevents policy makers without expertise to artificially set a price. Needless to say, since it is highly likely that only foreign concerns will have the wherewithal to undertake significant asset takeovers this policy effectively encourages significant foreign ownership.
Under alternative privatization approaches, there is a need to institute enforcement mechanisms that are both costly and not likely to succeed. By contrast, the strategic partnership mechanism minimizes enforcement problems since their cost is implicit in the 8 Another indicator of this concern at the level of public policy is the introduction of a Report on Financial Stability inaugurated by the NBH in 2000. 9 The differences between ROE are reversed when small and medium-sized banks, largely domesticallyowned, are aggregated.
13 winning bid's offer price. Also, it is likely that a strategic partner will be forward looking whereas alternative privatization approaches place undue emphasis on the present and the need for governments that own banking assets to generate privatization revenues. The forward looking nature of the transaction is also a signal of the likelihood of macroeconomic stability that, in turn, determines the likelihood of operational success.
Finally, and just as importantly, prospective strategic partners will demand transparency concerning the financial state of banking assets up for sale while the same is not true of most other forms of privatization.
Despite the aforementioned advantages of the strategic partnership approach is apt to be unsuccessful unless the transactions are completed in short order. There are a couple of reasons for the importance of speed. First, any excessive delays in announcing the results of a tender increase the likelihood that private information is leaked. Hence, future tenders may be adversely affected if bidders cannot be confident of confidentiality.
Second, a drawn out tender process provides an opportunity for existing competitors, and other interested parties, to marshal forces in an attempt to "kill the deal" as it were and protect their existing market share.
How Fragile is the Hungarian Banking Sector?
The descriptive evidence presented so far suggests that foreign dominance in the domestic banking sector has proved to be beneficial under the circumstances. The policy of searching for foreign strategic partners to take over existing domestic institutions, especially ones involved with the commercial lending side of banking, has created a stable and well functioning banking sector. Nevertheless, it would be useful to provide more formal evidence of the influence of foreign banks on overall banking performance 14 as well as on the performance of domestic institutions. Below we utilize annual data from individual banks in a panel setting to investigate these questions.
Though the available data are limited, Table 7 Tests decisively reject the panel with a common intercept in favor of a fixed effects model. Next, we find that the quality of a bank's portfolio has a significant impact on ROE such that an increase in doubtful and bad loans substantially reduces bank performance. A similar, but quantitatively smaller, effect is apparent from inflation, an indication that the "quality" of monetary policy will have a significant influence on ROE.
However, overall economic performance, as measured by real GDP growth, does not appear to influence bank performance.
Using a smaller panel, covering the years 1996-2000, portfolio quality and inflation continue to negatively impact ROE but there is also a modest effect from capital adequacy standards proxied here by capital adequacy ratios. Overall then, there is a little bit of evidence that "fragility" in the banking sector, as reflected by the variables included in the panel, has an impact on performance in the Hungarian banking sector. Finally, as the fixed effects estimates suggest differential impact of portfolio quality and inflation, in particular, according to the size of banks, the last column in Table 7 clearly shows that 15 "fragility" effectively impacts the largely domestically owned small and medium-sized banks. Consequently, as expected, the strategic partnering approach to privatization has a positive benefit on ROE. Of course, there may be other factors at work in explaining the results. However, the Hungarian experience is sufficiently at variance with the record in several other countries (see Table 5 ) to suggest that the method of privatization is at least an important candidate for the relatively successful record of large and predominantly foreign-owned banks.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the problems and choices facing Hungarian policy makers as they sought to place the newly reformed banking system on a sounder footing. The transitional experience, novel as it was, provided several models for the restructuring of banks. After several false starts, privatization of banks in Hungary was based on a strategy of allowing foreign domination of the banking industry partly assisted by the concerted, and largely successful, attempt to find foreign strategic partners. It can safely be said that the recession of the early 1990s in the industrial world hampered the development and search for stability in the Hungarian banking sector. However, it is also possible to conclude that the policy regarding foreign dominance of banking assets, and the consequent dramatic improvements in the stability of that sector, can be largely as a whole. Therefore, the issue of foreign ownership may be less important than the overarching regulatory structure under which banks operate. In this context, choosing foreign banks over home-grown ones reflects the role played by the process of the transition to market. Sources: National Bank of Hungary (2000), Magyar Nemzeti Bank (1999 , National Bank of Hungary Monthly Reports (various issues), and Annual Report (various years). NA signifies not available.
Notes: Column (2) is enterprise and personal loans to total deposits. In column (4), qualified loans represent the sum of loans needing special attention, substandard, doubtful or bad. The data reflect the impact of loan consolidation programs begun in 1992. Data for column (6) represent the share of capital in percent held by foreign owners. Note: Bold numbers indicate data after privatization led to a foreign majority owner. Sources: Bonin and Ábel (2000) . Cooperative Credit Institutions are not included in total. Notes: 1. Annual data in percent. Due to bias in small cross-sections, estimates are based on the first differences of the dependent variable, portfolio quality and the capital-adequacy ratio. Generalized least squares with cross-section weights used in estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity corrected. 2. Measured as the percent of total portfolio held in the form of doubtful or bad assets. 3. N is the number of observations, T the number of cross-sections. 4. Statistically significant at the 11%. * signifies statistically significant at the 1% ( 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992* 1992 1993 1993** 1994 1995 1996 1997 Bad Doubtful Substandard To be watched 
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